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1. Introduction 
In September 2015, a new television channel was launched in Baltic republic of Estonia. A               
home to 1,3 million people, it has a significant Russian-speaking minority, which is             
composing around a quarter of country’s population. The TV channel called ETV+ is a part               1
of state-funded Estonian Public Broadcasting (​ERR​) and was intended for Russian-speaking           
audience. However unbiased by the law, ETV+ was met with harsh criticism even before it               
went on air. The lively discussion in traditional and social media, numerous public debates              
over the necessity, shape, possible formats and other characteristics of the channel            
foreseeable channel attracted dozens of opinions, expressed by politicians, scholars, media,           
ethnic integration and security experts, journalists, and numerous other public figures. In this             
master thesis, I seek to explore the public debate surrounding the launch of ETV+ through the                
lense of securitization theory. 
The securitization theory is a constructivist language-centered approach to security. It shifted            
a focus of security studies beyond typical military and political materialist actions, extending             
it to non-military areas, such as economics, culture, environment, etc. According to initial             
theoretical framework by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), some phenomenon becomes a             
security issue, once called so by an actor. While threats can arise on a wide range of grounds,                  
only making them existential through political action and rhetoric securitizes them. If            
securitizing move (for instance, a speech act by a politician convincing the voters) is              
successful, the issue is no longer a political (economic, societal) one, but becomes a security               
problem. Speech act is thus of bigger importance, than the actual actions.  
Another important component of securitization-themed debate is its ethical considerations,          
since the authors have argued that security-jargoned labeling must be avoided, and social or              
political issues should be solved without securitizing them, if possible (​Wæver, 1999​). Based             
on the theoretical framework the theory provides, the thesis will explore the public debate              
over state-owned and -funded Russian-speaking TV channel in Estonia. The thesis will study             
the rhetoric of various actors, expressed in relation to the ETV+ channel and the grounds, on                
1 The name ETV+ has been chosen during the public contest, were people could submit their ideas. The 
abbreviation ETV stands for Estonian Television (​Eesti Televisioon​), the name that country’s most popular 
Estonian-language TV channel bears since 1955.  
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which its necessity has been articulated or government’s decision to launch a channel was              
criticized. Analyze of these speech acts will allow to explore, whether the debate has been               
securitized and to what extent.  
Previously, no special attention was given to a security dimension of public debate over the               
new media channel in Estonia. The current literature on a debate over the channel briefly               
summarizes ​pro et contra arguments, which are mostly related to the cost, media market              
situation, operation, content-production (arguments against), or increasing cohesion and state          
identity, fueling availability of a better-quality information, and decreasing inter-ethnic          
tensions in the society (arguments in favor). Another important feature includes language            
argument, as some considered broadening Russian-speaking public broadcasting a tool to           
reduce a motivation of Russian-speakers to learn Estonian language (Jõesaar, 2017). Another            
study focuses on the first year activities of the channel, briefly touching the public debate and                
devoting a special attention to management and content (Uibo, 2016). The latter work also              
neglects the variety of public debate, as it superficially studies Estonian-language media only.             
As will be shown later, despite small audience, Estonian media landscape is economically,             
linguistically and ideologically diverse. It is mentioned that public debate has been polarized             
and did not follow clearly outlined political trajectory, since skepticism or opposition to the              
channel was expressed by prominent members of leading political parties despite their            
ideological position (Parshukov, 2017, pp. 40-41). Young viewers point to the generational            
difference in perception of the channel, and propose the timing for launch of a channel was                
bad, as viewers have to choose between extremely polarized ETV+ and Russian TV channels,              
the Russian-speaking audience is used to (Vaserik, 2016, pp. 33-44). 
Various primary studies on the content of the channel are available, focusing on its              
cross-media features (Balode, 2016), political and social (Makarychev and Yatsyk, 2019) and            
late-night talk shows (Jakubovits, 2019). It has been noted that ETV+ provides a stage for               
public figures, often not just confronting with official Estonian positions, but even bringing in              
those of Kremlin. Local debate becomes even more polarized even within one            
ethnic-linguistic group, as justification for disappointment in Estonia's language or          
educational policies moves beyond national borders, and 'the skepticism toward official           
Estonia’s policy of managing inter-ethnic relations often leads to supporting the annexation            
of Crimea and the Russia-inspired war in Donbas, while anti-Putin stand in its turn is               
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conducive to the support of Estonia’s linguistic and educational policies' (Makarychev and            
Yatsyk, 2019).  
The securitization theory has been utilized in Estonian context by numerous studies. The             
topics explored include general security in the Baltic region and relevant political discourse             
(Kaljurand and Mälksoo, 2009), Russia’s compatriot policy towards Russian-speakers in          
Estonia (Gering, 2014), anti-immigration rhetoric in Estonia following global refugee crisis           
(Täri, 2017), and cyber security (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009; Oksaar, 2014). Little            
attention has been paid to securitization of Russian-speakers in Estonia (Kuczyńska-Zonik,           
2017). This leads us to conclusion that further study is needed, in order to discover possible                
securitization patterns in a public debate, depending on the language, political affiliation,            
position or other background of the opinion leaders involved. Possible findings may serve as              
a framework for further analysis of securitization of Russian-speaking population in Estonia            
or other ethnic minorities elsewhere.  
The current master thesis aims at distinguishing the extent to which the public discussion              
surrounding ETV+ has been securitized in 2007-8 and 2014-5 and what negative            
consequences it might have had for the perception of a new channel by the target audience.                
The following research will find out, in which context the discussion over necessity for              
public Russian-speaking TV channel begun and what arguments were brought into debate.            
The thesis will explore the main arguments proponents and opponents of the channel used,              
and what role securizing rhetoric played in them. Also, we will study the context these               
remarks have been made. While most of the primary material studied is opinion pieces, other               
samples include statements by the elected politicians in the public office. Also, the analysis of               
publicly expressed opinions allows to distinguish, whether politicians and journalists          
themselves belonging to Russian-speaking minority made different word choices and paid           
attention to other aspects of the channel, if discussing one in Russian language.  
One of the phases of the public debate over ETV+ coincided with the campaign period of two                 
elections. First, European Parliament elections were held in May 2014, and parliamentary            
elections took place the following year in Estonia, which were held on March 1, 2015. As                2
the issue of TV channel was on the agenda during numerous debates between the candidates,               
2 Aside traditional voting day, one third of voters opted for e-voting, the latter taking place on February 19-25, 
2015. See Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon 2015 for further details. 
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this allows to explore whether political parties took clear stand on the issue and what               
arguments did they use, and how securizing rhetoric corresponded with the ideological            
position of the party. ​For the latter purpose, party programmes will be explored, too. ​The               3
thesis is going to analyze, whether debate had several phases or not, and how it fluctuated                
over the years. Given the fact the creation of a channel has been obviously influenced by                
global events, i.e. Russia’s activities towards Russian-speaking diasporas in foreign countries           
and its military action in Ukraine, the debate is also analyzed for the extent, to which                
speakers referred to affairs beyond Estonian domestic agenda. The latter may include foreign             
examples of both ethnic minorities vulnerable to propaganda and successful media outlets,            
funded by the state for them.  
The thesis consists of introduction, three chapters and conclusion. The current introduction            
provides reader with general scope of the work and outlines research hypothesis. Also, a              
modest overview of existing literature on ETV+ channel is provided. In Section 2, the              
theoretical framework is described, with special emphasis on existing securitization studies of            
ethnic minorities within Eastern Europe. Also, the situational context is provided for            
Estonia’s internal situation in 2014-5 and the ways it was perceived globally as an aftermath               
of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Third section sketches on the current state of             
Russian-speaking population in Estonia and its media landscape. This enables reader with            
better understanding of socioeconomic and professional context, in which the new channel            
emerged. Section 4 provides an empirical study of a public debate over ETV+ in Estonia               
prior and shortly after its launch, analyzing it within the framework of securitization. The              
conclusion summarizes the findings of this thesis and outlines possibilities for perspective            
research. The thesis also contains an abstract, contents, abstract in Estonian and Russian, and              
the list of literature. If the language of a quotation is other than English, and original word or                  
phrase allows for multiple translations, the original is mentioned within the text or a footnote. 
 
3 European Parliament elections are different in nature, with candidates mostly presenting their own but 
party-based programs. Hence, only national election of 2015 is studied in this regard.  
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2. Securitization 
2.1 Who is next beyond Crimea? 
In the winter of 2014, the world has found itself a new reality: Ukrainian Crimea peninsula                
has been occupied by militants without distinctions, who were then called ​little green men​.              
However, Russian Federation involvement in the case was clear and easy to realize.             
Following the annexation of Crimea a quest for searching new spot of possible Russian              
invasion has begun. Many authors pointed to Estonian border-city of Narva. The            
argumentation is obvious: Narva’s predominantly Russian-speaking population, geographical        
position, remarkable amount of those holding Russian citizenship among the city population,            
and even historical linkages with the Great Northern War (Cowen, 2014; Sander, 2014;             
Berman, 2014; Ottens, 2014). Unsurprisingly, that given the above-mentioned circumstances,          
Russian-speaking population of Estonia has been a subject to diverse influence in media,             
politics, religion and other areas, imposed on them by their historical motherland, or, in other               
words, Russian soft power alongside various tools of influence. The seminal soft power             
concept explanation is provided by Joseph Nye (2004), and encompasses a selection of tools              
of persuasion and co-optation without coercion. All of the above mentioned factors            
influenced global media and expert community interest in the region, making it a perfect              
ground either for symbolic cross-river TV coverage or political analysis.  
Although some skepticism towards the Estonian government is common to smaller or larger             
extent with both the local elite in Northeastern Estonia (Eremeyev, 2017) and ordinary             
residents of the region (Trimbach and O’Lear, 2015), the vast majority of respondents in the               
various surveys on the subject remain critical of the prospect of joining Russia. Reflections              
on the potential of Narva becoming the next Russia’s target are different in tone and               
dominated by a restrained description of local life and its comparison with the neighboring              
city of Ivangorod on the Russian side of the river (Higgins, 2017). Observers tend to suggest                
the possibility of new forms of war emerging, rather than the traditional invasion (Coffey,              
2015; Gnauck, 2017). President Toomas Hendrik Ilves also admitted humorously that the            
foreign journalist who had gone to Narva to investigate separatism on the ground, has been               
shouted by the locals, who "do not want to join Russia" (Bahovski, 2016). It has to be                 
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mentioned that Narva and Northeastern Estonia has been already discussed in a similar             
context for quite a while (Smith and Wilson, 2007) and the question “​Is Narva going to                
become next Crimea?​” has been negatively responded by Estonian scholars both from social             
sciences and humanities (Dougherty and Kaljurand, 2015; Kasekamp, 2015). It must be            
noted, Narva or Estonia were not making headlines in global media in this manner in               
following years. We suggest it may be attributed to two main factors: decline of global               
interest corresponding to a decreased number of casualties in war in Donbass, as well as               
deployment of enhanced NATO forces presence in the Baltics and Poland, agreed in NATO              
Warsaw summit in July 2016, and operating from 2017 (NATO, 2016).  
Nevertheless, the concerns in question would not arise, if there was no consistent action from               
the Russian side in what Russia considers its 'nearabroad' (​blizhnee zarubezhje​), i.e. former             
Soviet republics. From 1990s onward, the notion of 'compatriot' (​sootechestvennik​) came into            
life. The concept is volatile and flexible, and currently is rooted in dozens of Russian official                
documents, including federal laws, presidential decrees, official statements and reports,          
foreign and security policy concepts, etc. According to various definitions in those            
documents, compatriots are the Russian-speakers, who reside abroad and share 'ethnic,           
cultural, linguistic, political, and even spiritual connotations' with Russia-living Russians          
(Grigas, 2016, pp. 57-93).  
Although it is arguable, which channels are utilized by Russia to introduce its concepts              
abroad, the main executive agency of Rossotrudnichestvo has been considered rather modest            
by scholars, when compared to British Council, which has ten times more staff working on               
promotion of British culture overseas (Rutland and Kazantsev, 2016). According to Agnia            
Grigas’s concept, the Russia's policy towards Russians living in the territory of the former              
Soviet Union and/or their countries of residence is divided into seven stages: soft power,              
humanitarian policies, compatriot policies, information warfare, offering passports, protection         
by military means, and annexation. At the same time, those stages may not occur exactly in                
that order and scenarios may occur in which only a few of the listed measures are applied.                 
Grigas notes that the application of all seven stages of compatriot policy to the Baltic States is                 
unlikely because it is doubtful that Russia could ever reach the stage of annexation.              
Nevertheless, these countries’ NATO and EU membership does not prevent Russia from            
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applying other measures, primarily to destabilize the political and economic environment           
(Grigas ​op. cit.​).  
Such widened notion of security needs a proper theoretical framework. As shown above, no              
actual existential threat was posed to Estonia as a whole either part of its territory. Beyond                
typical biannual military exercise, there was no publicly known actions taken by Russian             
military or its associated militants against Estonia. Nevertheless, the global media raised            
numerous concerns over Estonia’s perspectives, despite public was not presented with the            
evidence of possible Russian intervention, except for constant references to situation in            
several regions of Ukraine and Estonia’s Russian-speaking population, as possible          
sympathizer of such provisional military action. Therefore, nonexistent physical action          
imposes increased importance at the speech act and political choices behind it.  
2.2. Securitization: origins, framework and criticism 
In late years of Cold War and a following decade, technological shift and increasing              
globalization have reshaped the world tremendously. These changes did not fully eliminate            
military action from power politics, but have forced several stakeholders to bring new             
definitions of security dimension into a public debate. The securitization theory has been             
introduced in the 1990s by a group of Danish security scholars Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and                
Jaap de Wilde, colloquially referred to as Copenhagen School of Security Studies. However             
called a school, they have also worked and published on securitization independently, and in              
some aspects their understandings and views may be different from each other. According to              
authors of the theory, its main imperative derived from a wish to find a framework within a                 
wider debate on what is to be considered security. Simplified, two main opposing categories              
may be distinguished. The first of these approaches can be summarized as a conservative one:               
security is subject to a military action, involving application and resulting in casualties of              
rival’s forces or infrastructure. The other cohort, on the contrary, insisted on a widening of               
definition. Thus, security label could be attributed to various phenomena beyond classical            
military action.  
With theory initially sketched in late 1980s (Wæver, 1989), the new comprehensive            
framework was introduced in a titular book (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 1998) as a tool,               
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allowing to distinguish what is ​security and in what terms one can be scrutinized. Ever since,                
the theory has been applied to a wide range of matters, ranging from AIDS (Elbe, 2006) to                 
cyber security (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). At the time the core ideas of securitization              
theory were shaped, academic debate in the field focused on widening security matters             
particularly but not limited to economy and environment (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, pp.              
1-15). 
Copenhagen School postulates that they approach security through ​national security          
discourse and in most cases the actors are state-related: “By uttering ‘security’, a state              
representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a             
special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (Wæver 1995, p. 55). In their                 
understanding a term ​security ​has different meanings, depending on a referent object it is              
defined in relation to. Security becomes more complex, as threats may arise from anywhere,              
not limited to states or other human actors. However, the important feature of security is the                
emphasis on existential considerations behind it. Thus, different threats apply in various            
fields. As for political sector, they point out that ‘sovereignty can be existentially threatened              
by anything that questions recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority’ (Buzan, Wæver,           
de Wilde 1998, p. 22). Security is a shift from a usual and “normal” status, which takes place                  
when an issue is treated in a special way and is being prioritized compared to other matters                 
on stake. The latter may appear through extreme politicization, accompanied by broader            
attention to policy-making or increased government spending. Such prioritization, however,          
does not need to necessarily correspond to a real threat. It may arise in a situation without                 
actual threat, but nevertheless may end up being presented as such. Thus, security is              
self-referential, since existential threat can be both real and imaginable. Scholars distinguish            
between securitization and ​securitizing move​. Securitization only applies, if accepted by the            
referent audience. However, acceptance is a broad term and varies significantly based on the              
political or cultural context. Unless there is no signs of existential threat (or rhetoric on the                
matter), then one may speak only of the ​securitizing move​. Therefore, securitization is a              
combination of reshaping the normal situation, once it is also legitimized by the audience,              
who accepts the proposed extraordinarily actions (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, pp. 24-6). 
Hence, the theory argues that some phenomenon becomes a security issue, once called so by               
an actor. Those threats that are labelled existential become such through a speech act by an                
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actor. If speech act (for instance, a politician convincing the voters) is successful, the issue is                
no longer a political (e.g. economic, societal) one, but becomes a security problem (Wæver,              
2004, p. 13). Speech act is thus of bigger importance, than the actual actions. As the leading                 
proponent and author of a theory Ole Wæver puts it, 'the structure of securitization theory is                
organized around securitization as an act, as a productive moment, as a discontinuous             
reconfiguration of a social state' (2011).  
General criticism towards the theory proposed by Copenhagen School can be divided into             
two bigger groups: its application and the methodology related to the very speech act (see               
Villumsen Berling, 2011, for the overview of extensive theoretical debate on the latter).             
Numerous concerns over applicability include those for instance related to racism (Howell            
and Richter-Montpetit, 2020) or gender issues (Hansen, 2000), or political and ethical            
considerations (Eriksson, 1999; Huysmans, 2006), as well as their interplay (Huysmans,           
1998; Gad and Petersen, 2011). Also, at the core of the theory lies an assumption that                
securitization takes place, when extraordinary measures are imposed. Such approach is viable            
for western liberal democracies with established rule of law, as shift from “normal” is clearly               
visible and can in one way or another be perceived by the population. On the contrary, the                 
theoretical framework may not be fully applicable in a case of a more hybrid regime such as                 
Turkey (Bilgin, 2011) or one in transition, as was Kyrgyzstan in 2000s (Wilkinson, 2007).              
Additionally, several other matters must be considered, if applying theory to the country or              
territory where regular combating takes place (Olesker, 2014; Stritzel and Chang, 2015).  
The theory has also been noted for its almost unlimited possibilities to define any matter as                
security (Roe, 2004) contrary to early works of Copenhagen School, which limited security to              
five dimensions only (Buzan, 1991). If there is only a need for a speech act, the notion of                  
security becomes loosely defined and may be applied almost anywhere. This was taken into              
account, as Wæver argues for decrease of such word (and following policy-making) choices,             
and poses a straightforward question: 'why do you call this a security issue?' (1999). Hence,               
such labeling must be avoided, and social or political issues should be solved without              
securitizing them, if possible.  
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2.3. Securitization of ethnic minorities 
Among other topics, religious (Jamil, 2016) and ethnic minorities (Roe, 2004) have been a              
subject of securitization theory application. An article by Paul Roe (2004) outlines the             
problem of desecuritization of ethnic minorities, which the author considers hardly possible.            
While ethnic minority typically to certain extent deals with its own identity and maintaining it               
is a security-related matter, it poses certain risks for securitizing them both from inside and               
outside ​per se​. Roe also elaborates on a level of (de-)securizing, stating that desecuritization              
is possible for an individual, but hardly imaginable for a group. Since the language used to                
define minority vs. majority dichotomy is inevitably distinctive, desecuritization of those           
might be almost impossible: not using such language will jeopardize opportunities for            
definition of what minority. Securitization also leads to minority confronting it, as it is              
perceived as a threat to minority’s integrity. Deconstruction of a group to a smaller entities or                
personal level is also somewhat impossible, as this will almost diminish the minority itself              
(Roe, 2004).  
Ethnic minorities in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe especially risk being tackled              
through the lense of security (Kymlicka, 2001). Partially, this can be attributed to the nature               
of these states, which (re-)gained their sovereignty following the Communist regimes           
breakdown in the recent 30 years. Perhaps, nation-building and transition to democracy and             
market economy may have lead to more aggressive language usage and policy choices             
towards minorities. Also, there is significant empirical evidence suggesting that broader           
political discussion over minority rights in Central and Eastern Europe is bounded by nation              
states fears of possible secession (Kymlicka, 2001, cited in Roe, 2004).  
Roe’s argument has been overturned by Matti Jutila, who suggested deconstructivist           
approach to the issue of minorities’ securitization, predominantly based on Copenhagen           
School’s concepts of social security, supported by Brubaker’s take on ​nationalizing           
nationalism (Jutila, 2006). The latter refers to dubious success of nation building in weak              
nation states, probably mostly situated in the region in question. In such states, the efforts to                
establish a proper nation state run short, and cause even more vulnerability to the titular               
nation, undermining its attitude vis-a-vis minorities (Brubaker, 1996). However, such          
policy-making is enhancing minority identity, as the one builds upon against titular nation’s             
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efforts to challenge the rights of a minority and assimilate it. Jutila proposes a solution based                
on building a mutually acceptable new narratives, bringing more minority-initiated political           
discourse change into public debate. If existential threat is removed from political language,             
there will be no need to securitize the minority issue, he concludes (Jutila ​op. cit.​).  
While illustrating his argument, Jutila also carefully asserts that the situation in regard to              
Russian-speakers rights in Estonia has improved in late 1990s and early 2000s, with             
inter-ethnic difficulties still persisting in a society, but desecuritization discourse gaining           
momentum (Jutila, 2006). In part, this can probably be attributed to the country’s efforts to               
meet criteria for EU accession, and therefore need to alleviate some of the minority-related              
legislation. Also, this thesis tackles period between 2007 and 2015, while previous successes             
have been diminished at large due to several sociopolitical changes. Roe, however, is critical              
of Jutila’s idea and finds it hardly viable in Central and Eastern European context. He               
emphasizes importance of reasonable management of minority rights, by which one can            
“reduce, or even effectively rule out, the recourse to emergency politics”. Another option to              
desecuritize proposed by Roe is certain extent of assimilation based on mutual acceptance,             
which still allows for distinctiveness and preservation of minority’s identity (Roe, 2006).            
While both authors argue for desecuritization of ethnic minorities, they mostly do not refer to               
particular country. Various concepts can meet different levels of success in case of             
implementation ranging from country to country even within one region of Central and             
Eastern Europe due to a range of historical, demographical, linguistic and other possible             
reasons.  
In total, securitization theory has arised and later rose to prominence in the era following the                
fall of bilateral global security. Although it still mostly focuses on a state and its actions, it                 
also allows for other actors to be studied. Copenhagen school remarkably contributes to             
debate on widening the very notion of ​security​, bringing new forms of security into life, i.e.                
econome, environment, etc. According to the theory, securitization can be identified, when            
there is as a speech act, referring to an audience. In the above mentioned example, the                
Estonia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity was a referent object, and global media was             
securitizing actor. While there was extensive rhetoric on security-related matters by           
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securitizing actor, but no evident existential threat was posed to referent object, the whole              
process was limited to securitizing move only.  
The following chapters will seek an answer to the question in which way Russian-speaking              
minority in Estonia has been perceived by titular population within “abnormal” situation of             
2007 (so-called Bronze soldier crisis) and following 2014 (the year Russia annexed Crimea             
and kicked off military action in Eastern Ukraine). In order to apply the theory as main                
analytical tool, I will first describe the context: one of the preconditions outlined by              
Copenhagen School is a shift from ‘normal’ to unprecedented, when more harsh, extreme or              
costly policy-making is justified and accepted. Therefore, I will explore the context of events              
in 2007 and 2014-5: how they were perceived in Estonia, what influenced the general              
understanding of the events and whether or not there was an existential threat to country’s               
existence or well-being. Special attention should be devoted to the role and status of              
Russian-speaking community in these discussions.  
Once the situational context has been provided, I will focus on the channel-themed             
discussion. In order to distinguish between the extent to which the minority issue was              
politicized or even securitized, I will examine the public debate surrounding the media             
landscape and explore arguments of those discussing state-funded media for          
Russian-speaking minority of Estonia in terms of security. As described theory puts forward             
speech act as the main element of the securitization process, I will focus on publicly               
expressed opinions, using basic discourse analysis methodology (mostly based on Gee,           
2018). Main characteristics to be emphasized are the language choice, speaker’s status,            
context or source (op-ed in a newspaper, official statement, policy brief, etc.), and previous              
experience of a speaker with media issues and their political background.  
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3. Situational context 
3.1. Russian-speakers in Estonia: from aliens to dialogue partners 
During turbulent events of late 1980s-early 1990s some of the more conservative layers of              
Estonian society might have seriously believed that Russian-speaking people who came here            
or were born here in the Soviet era, will move (back) to Russia (Hughes, 2005). This was                 
clearly influenced by rhetoric on the preservation of national identity, as population            
composition has changed drastically under the Soviet rule, with Eastern slavic nations            
making up a half of the country‘s population (Brubaker, 2011). Especially during Perestroika             
and in first decade following restoration of independence, the national sovereignty was tied             
with ethnic anti-Russian sentiment and strong concerns about situation of Estonian language            
in public sphere (Velmet, 2019). We can now see that the vast majority of them have stayed                 
and live their ​own lives here. It is precisely ​their life: the education system is largely separate,                 
the settlement in the peripheral districts of Tallinn and socioeconomically declining industrial            
north-eastern Estonia seems to be extraneous or exotic to most Estonians. There are large              
gaps in the labor market between the ethnic groups, and the presence of non-Estonians in               
public service remains within the bounds of statistical error, inter-ethnic friendship or family             
are rarely the case. Russian-speakers have their own cultural life, and ​en masse vote for the                
same political party, though not exclusively Russian in its leadership (Kaldur and Vetik,             
2017; Ivanov, 2015; Kallaste, 2018; Lindemann and Saar, 2012; Tammaru ​et. al.,​ 2013). 
Currently, Estonia is a home to approximately 905 000 Estonians, 330 000 Russians, 23 000               
Ukrainians and 12 000 Belorussians. Most of the people belonging to Slavic ethnic             
minorities, alongside with minor groups as Tatars or Jews (~2000 each) can be             
conventionally labelled as Russian-speaking, as it is their primary language of           
communication in daily life, regardless their ethnicity (Statistikaamet, 2019; Verschik, 2005).           
This is due education system, social networks of people, media outlets and daily facilities and               
services by both government and business are to huge extent offered in Russian language              
alongside official Estonian. From mid-1990s onward, Estonia has had exclusionary          
citizenship policy: after the collapse of USSR Estonian citizenship was granted to those,             
whose ancestors lived in interwar Estonia. Such approach was motivated by security            
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considerations and strong ethnic-political polarization that was present in a society of this             
Baltic country at the eve of the Soviet Union and in the 1990s (Vetik, 2011). Thus, newly                 
developed system excluded Soviet-era migrants and their heirs, leaving them with two            
options: either obtain Estonian or any other citizenship, or become a stateless person, with a               
line "alien passport" on the cover of a document. Daily life limitations include number of               
professions one could not occupy if not being country’s national (mostly in government, but              
not limited to), active political rights on the local level only, and different visa regulations in                
foreign countries. After the initial introduction of citizenship-themed legislation in early           
1990s, it has also imposed several limitations on economic activity, which were abandoned             
later (Andersen, 2007). In order to naturalize, one has to undertake tests on language skills               
and ability to understand the Constitution. While most of the Russian-speakers opted for             
Estonian citizenship, many (predominantly, elderly), remained stateless, with their share in           
population declining year by year. Also, minor amount of Russian-speaking population           
obtained citizenship without naturalization, either having ancestors in Estonia before 1940, or            
receiving it for special services to the country and on other exceptional grounds. Amount of               
updates introduced in recent decades, also enabled citizenship for Estonian-born adolescents           
under 18, regardless their parental citizenship(s). Currently, there are approximately 160 000            
naturalized Estonian citizen, and 72 000 non-citizens (Siseministeerium, 2019).  
 
Figure 1. Breakdown of respondents of other ethnicities according to the level of integration index in 2008 and                  
2011. Source: Integration monitoring 2011, Ministry of Culture of Estonia. 
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Even from a superficial statistics one can conclude that there must be different identities              
amongst the group, which is not as homogenous as it may seem to outsider due to its size,                  
heritage and current state of affairs. In 2011, one of the leading the inter-ethnic process               
researchers in Estonia, professor Marju Lauristin proposed in a regular study commissioned            
by the Ministry of Culture, Russophones can be divided into several groups according to their               
identity and language skills. According to her study, share of those strongly or fully              
integrated to Estonian society numbered up to one third of Russian-speaking population            
(Lauristin, 2011; see Figure 1). Lauristin herself did not participate in following years             
Integration monitoring research group. Thus, such categorizations are not fully applicable to            
the study of 2015, since it was conducted using different methodology. One of the              
components scholars tackled in the abovementioned study was media choices and trust            
towards various sources of information. While typical person follows several media outlets,            
Russian TV channels especially dominated the landscape for the least integrated groups.  
National strategic documents on integration policies have shifted their focus from language            
learning to the matters such as identity, culture, cohesion, and socioeconomic prosperity            
(Arengukava "Lõimuv Eesti 2020", 2014). In February 2014, president of the Republic of             
Estonia Toomas Hendrik Ilves was presenting a Russian edition of his speeches collection at              
one of the oldest Russian-speaking schools of capital city of Tallinn. Asked by a moderator,               
whether he can say something in Russian himself, Swedish-born and American-raised Ilves            
turned directly to the audience full of highschoolers and slowly pronounced: ​ia vash             
prezident [I am your president]. School students reacted enthusiastically (Taklaja, 2014).           
Perhaps, they were not aware of the fact that some years ago president Ilves has provoked a                 
domestic and international controversy, stating using Russian language by president of           
Estonia would demonstrate an acceptance of Soviet occupation of the country in 1944-91             
(Whewell, 2008). Six years later, first female president of Estonia Kersti Kaljulaid went             
beyond Ilves' linguistic achievements on Russian front, and delivered a 15-minute speech at             
the local conference TEDxLasnamäe, predominantly attended by youth Russian-speakers         
from Tallinn. Language or ethnicity are not the most crucial components of success in a               
modern Estonian society or worldwide, while education, hard work and determination are the             
key for the future prosperity, she argued (Vabariigi Presidendi Kantselei, 2018).  
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Such a symbolic shift is symptomatic, as it did not only legitimate occasional usage of               
Russian language by the heads of state, but also demonstrated their openness for a dialogue in                
a completely new framework. Understanding that the message in Russian is more efficient             
than this delivered in Estonian, heads of state experimented in bridging the gaps with              
country's Russian-speakers. Youth or youngsters still can learn the language and contribute to             
Estonia's success, was their message. Also, speeches took place in the high school with              
Russian language of curriculum and at the conference held in predominantly           
Russian-speaking neighbourhood of Tallinn. Entering other's symbolic territory and         
switching to other's language by the heads of state was a welcoming gesture, among many               
others undertaken in recent years by the state. For instance, number of public relations              
officers, specializing on Russian-speaking media, has significantly increased in several          
ministries and governmental agencies from 2014 onward, with the government and numerous            
others themselves launching Russian-language accounts on social media. The latter has not            
gained sufficient popularity and remains questionable in terms of efficiency when providing            
Russian-speakers with crucial information (Lavrentjev, 2018). Such approach overcomes the          
officially proclaimed conservative and Estonian-centered language policies, as Russian is          
nowadays widely present even in governmental communications, shifting from old-fashioned          
rhetoric to pragmatic needs of informing the people (Berezkina, 2017; Adamson and            
Tshuikina, 2015).  
Estonian partisan system has followed pattern typical for the region, as divide between             
anti-communist stance and certain nostalgia towards Soviet past has coincided with ethnic            
boundaries (Duvold, 2015, cited in Saarts, 2016). Founded to counter Estonia’s efforts for             
regaining independence in late 1980s, the Intermovement (International Movement of          
Workers in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, ​Interdvizhenie​) has later split into several             
ethnic-centered minor political parties. While some of them entered the national parliament            
Riigikogu in the 1990s, they were not sustainable. The reasons are twofold: small number of               
Estonian citizens of Russian origin in early 1990s to attract as voters, as well as constant                
inability to reach a long-lasting strategic union between number of little political forces             
(Saarts, 2016). In 2000s, socioliberal Center Party managed to attract Russian-speakers with            
their leftist agenda on social issues and pronounced opposition to nationalistic rhetoric of             
other political actors. Center Party recruited several Russian-speaking public figures, who           
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successfully rose to prominence at municipal level and won local elections in most of              
Ida-Viru towns, as well as cemented its power in Tallinn under leadership of mayor and party                
leader Edgar Savisaar for several election cycles. In 2000-10s, Center Party was supported by              
70-85% of Estonian Russian-speakers (Saarts, 2015). With strong power in Tallinn, Center            
Party deployed a large media network funded by nation’s capital budget. It included two free               
newspapers (in Estonian and Russian), as well as Tallinn TV broadcasting in Estonian. For              
Russian-speakers, from 2008 onwards city of Tallinn commissioned several TV shows from            
privately owned PBK channel. The latter has been subject to critique from both political              
opponents and media experts, as Center Party politicians prevailed in the shows others were              
given little or no opportunity to share their opinion (ERR News, 2020).  
  
3.2. Russian-speaking media landscape 
Russian media in Estonia has a long and captivating history, dating back almost for two               
centuries. Scholars consider modern-day Russian media in Estonia a minority media, as it is              
both produced and consumed by the members of local diaspora (Vihalemm and Jakobson,             
2011). The very first local regular magazine in Russian was published in the Governorate of               
Estonia in 1832 (Titov, 2012). Although, local diaspora numbered approximately to 90 000             
Russians in interwar independent Republic of Estonia, the number of publications has            
significantly increased and according to different estimates reached 100-130. However, many           
of those newspapers and magazines experienced financial troubles, and due to harsh rivalry             
and relatively reluctant welcome from the audience existed for a short period of time              
(Issakov, 2011, pp. 31-32). In Soviet and post-Soviet Estonia, numerous newspapers and            
magazines were published in Russian, showing signs of decline in variety and circulation             
figures from 1990s onward. In 2010s, the national printed outlets in Russian included two              
general interest daily newspapers, two weekly newspapers, one business-themed newspaper,          
aside numerous local publications or those, focusing on issues such as culture and lifestyle              
(Titov, 2012).  
In 1958, first radio and TV broadcasts in Russian were launched in occupied Soviet Estonia               
alongside channels and shows in Estonian. Following the restoration of independence in            
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1991, these media assets were transformed into Estonian Television and Estonian Radio            
respectively, to be merged into a corporation under the name of the Estonian Public              
Broadcasting or ERR (from Estonian ​Eesti Rahvusringhääling​) in 2007, which later also            
entered the web-based news production (ERR, 2017). The Parliament passed relevant law,            
which among other things stated that ERR’s duty is to ‘broadcast programs <...> that meet the                
information needs of all groups of the population, including minorities’ (Riigiteataja, 2007).  
Under the ERR, ​Raadio 4 station has been broadcasting for Russian-speakers since 1993             
onward, providing a wide selection of shows on the topics ranging from social issues to               
politics, and enjoying warm welcome among its audience. Competing with two or three             
privately owned stations, which are focused on music and lifestyle rather than political and              
cultural life, ​Raadio 4 saw a huge backlash in its coverage numbers in the wake of coverage                 
of events in Ukraine in 2014. Over a year, the share dropped from 15,7% to 13,11%, resulting                 
in 30 000 listeners abandoning the station. Experts stated rather one-sided coverage of the              
war and Crimean occupation as a reason, since official Russia’s positions were almost fully              
neglected in both the news and political shows. While journalists did not express any              
criticism over anyone limiting their freedom in editorial policy, one may presume the             
audience just did not enjoy the expected amount of opinions shared by Moscow officials. The               
ERR leadership admitted the problem, but also remarked that decline may derive from private              
stations’ rivalry (Paris, 2014). 
First considerable online media outlets in Estonia begun operating in early 2000s (Balčytienė             
and Harro-Loit, 2009). In 2010s, main online news outlets in Russian included two big              
websites owned by main private players in Estonian market, and their minor counterpart run              
by ERR. There were numerous attempts to launch independent news publications, but they             
did not survive due to economic reasons. Several topical or lifestyle websites and platforms              
operate as well. Three resources, directly linked to or controlled by the Russian government              
and its local adepts exist as well, but have not gained remarkable popularity among the               
audience. For instance, local edition of Sputnik had 252 thousands visitors in May 2017,              
compared to 2,6 million of Russian-speaking Postimees web at the same month. Also, if              
privately owned popular Russian-speaking media is predominantly read by locals,          
Russia-backed news websites attract larger share of their audience from Russia (Propastop,            
2017). Outlets that are generally labeled as propaganda, have also experienced legal troubles             
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with some of their executives forging the documents (Kaitsepolitsei 2016, p. 9; Kaitsepolitsei             
2014, pp. 8-9; Roonemaa, 2018). 
Estonian TV scene has been perhaps even more diverse than above-mentioned other types of              
media. During the period from 1991 onward, the public broadcasting has always had a              
newscast, airing once or twice a day in the evening prime-time. In 2000s and early 2010s,                
several attempts were made to launch political talk shows to be aired at the second program                
of national television, i.e. ETV2. Due to unstable funding they never lasted longer than              
two-three seasons. Numerous minor privately owned channels have been operating in           
Russian since 1992 (Titov, 2012), but their share has never been remarkable, as none of these                
appeared in daily share rankings in 2010s. Due to several legal, financial and professional              
limitations, local privately owned Russian-speaking TV stations were not able to produce full             
programm, mostly limiting their broadcasting to one-two hours a day (Jõesaar, 2014a). The             
TV market has been dominated by channels of Russian origin, which had either additional              
locally produced shows or only locally-suited adverts. These channels are mostly registered            
within one of the EU states, although their main content comes directly from Russia. The               
extent to which Russian TV stations has been transferred under control of Kremlin-related             
oligarchs is well-described phenomenon (Ostrovsky, 2015, pp. 228-303; Azhgikhina, 2007).  
 
Figure 2. Aggregated daily    
shares (%) of TV channels     
in Estonia in   
January-September of  
2015, Kantar-Emor. 
 
 
The leading TV station among Russian-speakers in Estonia is ​PBK (abbr. from ​Pervyi             
Baltiyski Kanal [First Baltic Channel]), operated by local media executives. Aside Russian            
content produced for the ​Channel One , it runs several locally produced shows and a local               4
daily newscast, following daily ​Vremya​. While newscast’s funding comes from advertising           
4 Owned by the Federal Agency for State Property Management, National Media Group, and VTB Capital. 
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income, other shows are directly ordered by Tallinn city, making up 29% of this enterprise’s               
revenue in 2015 (Koorits, 2018). In addition to ​PBK​, other popular channels of Russian              
origin include ​RTR Planeta , NTV Mir (global edition of ​NTV​) and Ren TV Estonia . Daily               5 6
share of PBK, RTR Planeta and NTV Mir almost equals at 4-7%, while Ren TV lags behind                 
with less than 2% (Figure 2). 
As one can conclude from such explicitly diverse media landscape, local Russian-speakers            
enjoy wide selection of any media type. Reservations can be expressed in regard to print               
media, which is giving its niche to more accessible, responsive, and mostly free online              
outlets. Both print and online are ​en masse owned by Estonian corporations or local              
municipalities, with exceptions of propagandistic nature staying unpopular. Radio scene is           
stable, with the leading station being part of national public broadcasting, which sometimes             
might be challenged by privately owned music-centred counterparts. All of the popular TV             
stations broadcasting in Russian are locally branded editions of popular TV channels, owned             
by Russian state or closely affiliated businesses. All of these have little or no              
Estonia-produced content. As people consume media of different kind, it can be argued that              
local Russian-speakers are able to receive information from sources of different political or             
national affiliation, demanding better analytical skills from the audience in order to            
distinguish between often contrasting narratives. According to survey data, in 2015 74% of             
non-Estonians considered Russia’s channels and PBK’s local newscast either very or           
relatively important sources of information. Social media, Radio 4, and Estonia-produced           
Russian-speaking newspapers and websites all placed within the same category with their            
importance admitted by 40-50% of respondents (Sepper, 2015).  
 
 
5 Global edition of Russia channel owned by the VGTRK holding. 
6 Locally-suited only by its name, but not the content edition of Ren TV owned by the National Media Group. 
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4. Discussion  
4.1. 2007-8: the Bronze Soldier and History 
Estonia may be characterized as a peaceful society: political manifestations has always been             
reserved and never attained a certain degree of violence between protesters and authorities.             
Even during turbulent events of 1987-91, the independence was regained without human            
casualties, contrary to that of Lithuania or Latvia. However, one exception still prevails for              
re-independent country: late April 2007, or the so-called Bronze soldier crisis.  
Estonia has been noted for debates over its past, especially concerning World War II and               
Stalinist repressions in the 1940s. Mostly, juxtaposing ethnic communities of Estonians and            
local Russians share completely opposing views on these events, with most of Estonians             
perceiving the country’s occupation by the Soviets the worst period in the 20th century. The               
local Russian community, on the contrary, often falls in line with official Moscow             
interpretation and perceives 1940 occupation as ‘voluntary’ accession to the USSR, and 1944             
as deliberation from Nazis. Hence, Soviet/Russian Victory day on 9th of May is of big               
importance for local Russian-speakers and so are the related rituals and sites, increasingly             
promoted by Russian authorities in recent decades. One of a symbols for the beginning of               
Soviet occupation of 1944 is associated with reburial of a dozen Soviet soldiers in 1947 to the                 
center of Tallinn. The statue of mourning Soviet soldier was erected the same year and               
eternal flame worked at the site from 1964 to 1995. Over the years, clashes between the two                 
ethnic groups rose in the society and the statue was framed as identity threat for Estonian                
public. Following parliamentary elections in 2007, the newly appointed government lead by            
Reform Party promised to remove the statue. This resulted in big anti-governmentally minded             
riots with almost 1500 participants, 200 of whom ended up being arrested and one got killed                
in an accident. The statue was removed to the military cemetery and ethnic communities              7
became way more antagonized than they used to be ever before in Estonian recent history               
(Ehala, 2009; Brüggemann and Kasekamp, 2008; Bernauer, 2015, pp. 82-84).  
7 The person was killed in a clash with some other civilians, not the police forces. 10 years later, the police 
dismissed the case as unsolved. 
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Estonian government has raised concerns over the need to properly inform local            
Russian-speakers for years, as differences in media landscapes were evident as early as in              
1991 (Iushkin, 2016, p. 148). The intense coverage of the whole process surrounding the              
Bronze soldier crisis in Estonian, local Russian-speaking, Russian, and global media led to             
even bigger inter-ethnic polarization, also supported by decline in Estonian-Russian trade and            
resulting in cyber-attacks on Estonian private and governmental websites. The debate over            
failed national integration policy for Russian-speaking minority intensified amid Bronze          
Soldier crisis. One of the elements rightly pointed out by numerous experts was the media,               
and so discussion over necessity of a governmentally funded TV channel on the basis of               
National Broadcasting (​ERR​) begun.  
Initial idea that government came up with, was a TV channel in Russian, operating in early                
May 2007 under ETV for a short period of time. TV executive called the plan ‘Victory Day                 
channel’, as the one was intended to go on air around May 9 (Kaio, 2007, pp. 12-13), the                  
Victory Day in Great patriotic war celebrated in Russia and several countries of CIS. At the                
time, government feared that second stage of riots around the Bronze Soldier statue may              
follow by the Victory Day. However technical preparations were made, temporary channel            
never made it to the screen. Neither any new riots happened in early May: the government                
officially payed a visit to a new site of the statue on May 8. Thus, discussion over other                  
long-run options to sufficiently inform Russian-speakers were evaluated. Main solutions          
proposed by politicians or experts included a completely new TV channel under ERR,             
ordering content and showing it on a privately-owned TV channels, or even establishing a              
multilingual newspaper as part of ERR. Among other options, parliament member and social             
democrat Marianne Mikko suggested that instead founding a new channel, national budget            
could ensure Russian subtitles for ETV, so Russian-speakers could easily follow other shows             
in addition to the already existing daily newscast in Russian. Linguist Mart Rannut smashed              
the suggestion, saying that subtitles should be in Estonian. This helps to understand and              
improve little-known language, which Estonian is for local Russian minority, he argued.            
Rannut also made a joke that ‘giving every viewer a million [kroons] could be cheaper, than                
establishing a new channel’ (Rannut, 2007, p. 4), which shows explicitly that no clear              
understanding about the actual possible cost was indicated at early stage.  
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Although some concerns were raised over unclear but presumably high channel operation            
costs, it was turned down by sociologist professor Marju Lauristin. Discussing new            
integration-themed research at the parliament, Lauristin quoted her anonymous colleague,          
who said that running a TV channel will probably cost the budget as much as buying two                 
armoured fighting vehicles (AFV). Which one is priority for Estonian security, Lauristin            
rhetorically asked (Lauristin, 2008). Despite slightly inaccurate estimate, the metaphor          
demonstrates that discussing inter-ethnic integration at the national legislature, Lauristin          
opted for framing a channel as a means of security, directly comparing it with the military                
equipment. In this particular case, the parliament was an audience, with sociologist Lauristin             
acting as a securitizing agent, speaking on a behalf of scientific community. While AFVs are               
used in the military and are clearly intended to ensure national security from external threats,               
their comparison to a local Russian-speaking channel is slightly misleading. The channel            
would ensure local Russian-speaking community is ‘properly’ informed about Estonian news,           
making it a referent object. In a broader sense, we may think of a whole Estonian society as a                   
referent object, since its cohesion and better inter-ethnic understanding would be ensured            
through Estonia-originated media.  
During the seminar on infowars, media analyst Raul Rebane stated the crisis has shown that               
both Western (probably, mostly meaning English-speaking) and Russian media have big           
influence on Estonia. According to Rebane, Estonia is situated in the middle of information              
war, fueled from both sides. Thus, Estonia is under media-initiated crossfire (Trofimov, 2007,             
p. 5). Such approach fully neglects the role of local media, let it be in Estonian or Russian                  
language. However, in 2007 or any other recent year local media landscape clearly was not               
limited to Russian sources only, with various other outlets available in Russian language and              
followed by the minority. Also, it is difficult to imagine a person that only follows the news                 
of his country of residence through the lens of several other countries/cultures. According to              
the studies conducted at the time, remarkable 74% of Russian-speakers felt they were             
well-informed about developments in Estonia, while only 28% regularly followed Estonian           
TV (Vihalemm, 2008). Despite war-themed vocabulary, Rebane’s remarks are not clearly           
indicating the existential threat. 
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Perhaps, understanding of Estonia under crossfire or permanent civilizational conflict is true            
in a bigger philosophical dimension, and leads as to seminal theory of Huntington (2002, pp.               
21-29) or recalls the connotations of World War II, where Estonian men were drafted to both                
Red Army and Wehrmacht, but never fought in Estonian uniform. The World War II topics               
are also intertwined with the way Russian media perceives and covers it. Mart Rannut noted               
that in September 2007 ETV showed a popular history show in Russian entitled ‘Positive              
Narva’, in which 1944 was indicated as a Soviet deliberation year (Rannut, 2007, p. 4). Such                
loose interpretations of history in the same year following Bronze Soldier crisis, have been              
perceived unacceptable by many Estonian intellectuals. This commentary indicates that          
instead of allowing journalists and editors do whatever they want, even the discussion over              
possible channel’s content has been marked by topics of only one ‘right’ historical memory.  
Public debate over necessity of a Russian-speaking channel intensified during Bronze Soldier            
crisis. Estonian government was so desperate to sufficiently inform local Russian-speaking           
minority that they even considered running a temporary TV channel in Russian for the              
possible second wave of the riots. While most of the public discussion focused on financial               
issues, numerous experts articulated for creation of the channel, using military jargon,            
referring to ongoing information war between West (Europe in general and Estonia) and East              
(Russia), or even searching for connotations and arguments in Estonian experience of World             
War II. The latter was especially tragic, as country not only suffer human and infrastructure               
war casualties, but also lost its independence and experienced extreme Soviet repressions. 
Some elements of Bronze Soldier crisis (primarily, unprecedented riots, but also cyber            
attacks) has been perceived as existential threat to Estonia’s existence and sovereignty, thus,             
making Estonia (its legitimate government, society and country’s understandings of its           
historical heritage) referent object in Copenhagen school terms. It is hard to determine,             
whether Russia was the only source of such threat (biased media coverage, alleged cyber              
attacks), or it was particular individuals of local Russian-speaking community (who           
facilitated protests, eventually turning into riots).   8
8 Four individuals were charged with organization of the riots, but the court found them innocent next year. 
Soon, three out of four left the country for Russia. 
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4.2. 2007-8: Temporary Solutions 
Without national channel in Russian, local Russian-speakers will be left in ‘media space run              
by Kremlin-backed TV channels’, said ERR board member and conservative politician           
Andres Herkel, a parliament member from IRL. Member of liberal Reform party, minister of              
culture Laine Jänes had no clear vision of the channel, but promised it will focus on                
culture-themed content (Rannamäe, 2007, p. 6). Margus Allikmaa, the CEO of ERR was             
skeptical over perspective of a full channel operating in Russian, and praised temporary             
funding for particular shows as a solution. The cost- and content-centered debate of 2007              
spring about Russian-speaking media was so much intensified that Allikmaa proposed to wait             
for another year until we could ‘come back and make our final decisions’ on the matter of a                  
new channel. At the end of the day, closing down the whole channel if unsuccessful will be                 
way more complicated task than concluding production of a single talk-show, he argued             
(Tarand, 2007, p. 13).  
Over the time, unclarity remained, and instead of focusing on either Russian-speaking            
channel or something else, politicians described it as ‘multicultural’ channel. The ERR            
calculations indicated a need for approximately 50 million kroons of additional funding to             
launch ETV2 in 2008. While government struggled with allocating proper funding, ERR            
turned directly to the parliament. In a letter sent to the Cultural Affairs Committee, head of                
ERR board Andres Jõesaar advocated for the funding, asserting that currently ‘part of foreign              
TV channels provide disinformation and undermine the foundations of our country’           
(Kalamees, 2007, p. 7). Such rhetoric is a perfect example of securitizing move, since Jõesaar               
is clear about threat (foreign, i.e. Russian TV channels), and referent object (Estonia and its               
‘foundations’), advocating for extra policy-making and funding, to be provided by the            
audience (government and/or parliament). By the end of 2007, media reported that all leading              
political parties have expressed their support for a new channel, but argue about its funding               
(Poom, 2007, p. 4). After intense political debate over the funding and technical preparations,              
ETV2 went on air in mid-April 2008 as a test channel, initially broadcasting only 6 hours a                 
day (Linkgreim, 2008). In summer 2008, ETV2 broadcasted Beijing Olympics, and mostly            
focused on youth, culture or films in the spare time.  
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At the same time, minister of population and ethnic affairs, social democrat Urve Palo              
ordered a series of talk shows for Russian-speakers from privately owned PBK channel. ERR              
ethics advisor Tarmu Tammerk criticized the move, urging to stop such practices, as they              
create an unprecedented situation, where government directly controls the content of a TV             
show. He concluded: ‘misunderstandings over commissioning talk shows in Russian          
language foremost demonstrate that the government has no clear plan for media policy at all’               
(Tammerk, 2008). Shows in Russian language came to ETV2 in early 2009, and in part were                
funded by European Union mechanisms through national Integration Foundation, which          
determined their temporary nature. Such temporary project-based funding did not ensure           
change of habits among the viewers, and all projects of this kind ceased to exist over a year                  
or two. At the same time, ERR launched web news site in Russian, novosti.err.ee. Although               
good in quality, one appeared later than its private counterparts, which complicated attracting             
the readers.  
Over 2007-8, numerous politicians and experts expressed their support for the channel, while             
some of them still being hostile about its perspectives to gain popularity with             
Russian-speaking audience due to a wide range of reasons, mostly limited to lack of              
professionals, probably leading to a poor quality of production compared to Russian            
channels.  
Although the TV channel, subsequently named ETV2, was in part intended for            
Russian-speaking minority, Estonian politicians nor expert community did not interact with it            
as an audience. Several politicians and experts securitized Estonia’s wellbeing and           
sovereignty through their speech acts, arguing that referent object is under the threat. As              
shown, it was mostly experts and media executives trying to convince policy-makers in             
necessity of a channel. Thus, most of the parliament members are the audience, as through               
them are their voters, i.e. the population or general audience. Creation of a new institution               
and allocation of additional funds for that purpose may be described as extraordinary             
measures. However, in the above described case, the ethnic minority itself remains not             
securitized, and is largely left out of discussion. Finally, ETV2 was launched and soon              
switched to a broader agenda (sports, culture), clearly not limited to Russian-speaking            
broadcasting. No funding was provided for a full-scale channel in Russian, hence the             
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message raised by expert community was not fully accepted by the politicians of the              
parliament and/or government. Therefore, despite clearly distinguishable securitizing moves,         
one can not conclude the securitization has succeeded in this case.  
4.3. 2014: Ukrainian Connection 
For Estonian society, it was evident that internal crisis of Ukraine by winter of 2014 has                
transformed into multilateral conflict, with Russian media increasing a degree of unbiased            
coverage of the events in Crimea and Donbass. The global media and politicians worldwide              
begun talking about information war Russia engages in not only with Ukraine, but also with               
the West. The response, however, varied from country to country even within one region.              
Contrary to that of Baltic neighbours, Estonian minister of culture Urve Tiidus was not so               
harsh about closing down Russian TV channels in Estonia, suggesting opening a new one              
instead. ‘Rather, what is important in this information war <...> is whose information is more               
true and reliable. This means it may be advantageous to add such channels rather than ban                
them,’ Tiidus said (Nael, 2014b). Even in this reasonable and solution-oriented suggestion,            
the assertion is clear that it is ‘their’ information not being ‘true and reliable.’ As will be                 
shown below, various arguments have been raised during the channel debate, but the role of               
Ukrainian conflict as an impetus was admitted by ERR CEO Margus Allikmaa (Männi,             
2014), with semiotician and IRL politician Mihhail Lotman pointing that channel is not a tool               
to solve a crisis, and should rather be tackled as a ‘preventive means’ (Lotman, 2014 b).  
Russian TV channels are a primary source of information on global affairs for             
Russian-speakers, not Estonians: at the time, only 8% of Estonians considered Russian TV             
important source of information, contrary to that of Russian-speakers making up to 74%. At              
the same time, both groups considered their knowledge of global affairs almost the same,              
with 50% and 46% respectively (Sepper, 2015). It is evident from these figures, it was not                
Estonians who were considered the object of Russia’s information war possible successes.            
With Russian-speakers not only following different media outlets, but also probably being            
more reluctant to Russia’s agenda due to their historical heritage, common language, and             
widespread dissatisfaction with Estonian integration policies and hostile towards Estonian          
state in general. Professor Marju Lauristin, running for European Parliament with Social            
Democrats, argued that inactivity is not an option: ‘if we do not provide information              
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ourselves, we will leave our Russian-speaking population for Russian channels. For some            
reason, this has still not been done, although in words safety, security and integration are high                
priorities’ (Einmann, 2014). Placing integration between security and safety, Lauristin did not            
only refer to Copenhagen School’s concept of societal security, but also suggested            
Russian-speakers are to be treated in a special way as Estonian state’s appeal to them is                
constantly challenged by Russia. Referring to situation in Ukraine in early spring 2014, she              
extrapolated uncertainty of Donbass conflict to Estonia, saying that Russia’s actions in            
Ukraine, including those in media space, ‘is also part of our security’ (Polienko, 2014). Such               
patronizing tone over Russian-speaking minority was prevailing in an whole debate. As one             
journalist put it, had taken place on a ‘child-parent’ level (Laurisaar, 2014) or, in Center Party                
politician Yana Toom’s words, it was a ‘mission’ undertaken by ‘older brother’ (Rechkin,             
2014), assuming that they knows for sure, what is better for ​child​’s sake and what programs                
or channels should be excluded from the menu.  
Former head of ERR board and media scholar Andres Jõesaar tried to convince the audience               
to address media not as a part of security. He argued, for a part of Estonian public,                 
‘Russian-language Estonian TV channel is primarily a subject of national defense. <...> The             
channel's funding could be covered by rising defense spendings.’ He went on, suggesting the              
costs are not big compared to military sector, as yearly running a channel will probably equal                
a cost of purchasing one armoured fighting vehicles (Jõesaar, 2014b). The same comparison             
with more optimistic guess about a price of two AFVs equaling operational costs of              
Russian-speaking channel was made by Lauristin in 2008. With 6 years, even rhetorical             
comparison remained in place. Not sharing Jõesaar’s peaceful tone, parliament member Liisa            
Pakosta of IRL suggested establishing a channel is a part of ‘psychological defense,’ and              
shall be included in military budget indeed, as modern warfare is unconventional and             
‘non-military public servants are involved in a whole new way, no signs of distinction, but               
only very expensive satellite equipment’ (Pakosta, 2014). The latter refers to conflict in             
Donbass and annexation of Crimea, which both (at least in part) were executed by soldiers in                
uniform without distinctive signs.  
While citing Russian hybrid action in Donbass as an example, numerous experts reasonably             
articulated the threat as existential not only for Ukraine, but for other countries as well,               
including Estonia. Referent object, however, was not a whole country, but a            
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Russian-speaking minority, meaning that if one is informed sufficiently, it will not pose             
another, internal challenge to national security. While supporting the need to establish the             
channel, minister Tiidus, parliament member Pakosta, and sociologist Lauristin made          
securitizing move and placed the channel issue above every-day politics. Contrary to that,             
despite supporting the channel, politician Lotman and scholar Jõesaar in their remarks tried to              
desecurize the matter and suggest channel should be founded on usual basis, not as a               
crisis-solving tool.  
4.4. 2014-5: Propaganda Debate 
While Russian-speaking TV experiments on the basis of ERR did not prove to be sustainable               
in a long perspective, global politics provided new impetus for domestic debate. Annexation             
of Crimean peninsula by Russia and subsequent events in Eastern Ukraine not only attracted              
worldwide coverage and forced EU to impose sanctions on Russia, but also fuelled             
widespread usage of the notion of information war. With Russian state agenda on             
developments of bilateral relations with Ukraine broadcasted globally through Russian media           
being clearly different from Estonian public and governments understandings, the need for            
unbiased coverage of world politics in Russian and decreasing rising tensions in the             
Russian-speaking minority arose again.  
Former journalist running for European Parliament with conservative IRL, Anvar Samost           
suggested Europe should ‘fight Russian propaganda’ in a unified manner, establishing joint            
initiative under the name of ​Voice of Europe​. An analogy to renowned from Cold war times                
radio station called Voice of America, Samost’s idea provoked a wide debate well beyond              
Estonia (Baltijskie…, 2014). With Latvia and Lithuania banning several Russian TV stations            
and also discussing to establish a new joint Baltic television in Russian, Estonian politicians              
and media executives were restrained about the proposal (Vabariigi Valitsus, 2014; Latvian            
Institute, 2014; ERR News, 2014). Mihhail Lotman even suggested that Russian TV is mostly              
harmful to people in Russia, not elsewhere, and we should not be afraid of it (Lotman,                
2014a).  
The most often used term in describing the TV channel before its launch, however, was               
(counter-)propaganda. Confirming the channel is not going to do propaganda, TV executives            
admitted nobody is going to rival with Russian TV stations (Ruussaar, 2014a), and channel              
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obviously can have guests, whose views on conflict in Ukraine are perhaps different from              
that of Estonian government or majority of population (Ruussaar, 2014b). However, given            
historical connotations, person following predominantly Russian media ‘equals the         
government and propaganda’ (Ruussaar, 2014c). According to Andrei Hvostov, journalist          
and Social Democratic candidate for European election, the same is perhaps true especially in              
Estonian context due to prevailing among Russian-speakers dissatisfaction in integration          
policy, since people will ‘automatically perceive new TV station as a governmental            
propaganda’ (Randlaid, 2014). Being hostile about perspective of a new channel, media            
scholars asserted that a TV is not enough, since narratives presented through mass media are               
always based on a broader heritage, e.g. history or literature, which Estonian state is not               
going to provide Russian-speakers with (Tatrik, 2014).  
Amid crisis in Ukraine of 2014, politicians and experts in Estonia labeled influential Russian              
TV channels ‘propagandistic’ and securitized their influence over Estonia, especially its           
Russian-speaking minority. Russia’s alleged success in media operations in Ukraine and           
globally, forced local decision-makers to securitize Russian media in Estonia, too.           
Nevertheless, according to studies, ethnic Estonians (or those speaking Estonian as their            
mother tongue) follow very little or no Russian media, hence the main target audience of it is                 
local Russian-speaking community.  
Referring to previous intense phase of TV debate in 2007 following Bronze Soldier crisis, in               
2014 discussions over internal security and inter-ethnic cohesion became intertwined with           
defense matters. Hence, Russian media could have been securitized only via local            
Russian-speaking minority. While broadly discussing information war, several voices were          
raised to avoid labeling new Russian-speaking TV channel as ‘counter-propaganda.’          
However, often discussing it in militaristic jargon or even suggesting to fund the issue              
through defense spendings, was present.  
With ‘Russian propaganda’ identified as an existential threat, Samost’s suggestion to fight it             
in a joint international manner is therefore broadening the notion of referent object from              
Estonia to the whole continent (or, given the election context, to European Union). The              
audience in this case is not only the Estonian public or voters, but a broader global dimension                 
of decision-makers, including those in other countries. At the same time, numerous voices             
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were raised, suggesting the channel is not counter-propaganda and stating that Russian            
propaganda is not a threat for Estonia. 
Finally, channel was funded by increase of relevant budget line under the ministry of culture.               
However, little effort was made by leading decision-makers to desecurize the issue. In a              
slight contrast with her previous remarks about information war, in November 2014 minister             
Tiidus suggested the opposite, stating ‘let’s try not to talk about war,’ once asked if Estonia is                 
falling behind Russia in the information war. According to Tiidus, ‘channel is not an attack               
nor defense,’ and one must focus on the content instead (Simson, 2014). Prime-minister             
Taavi Rõivas of Reform party admitted the government was presented with plans of content              
to be aired on the future channel, and asked their questions, but final decision about               
management and production is up to media professionals. Summarizing his government           
activities at the last press conference before parliamentary elections, Rõivas said of future TV              
channel: ‘it is exactly the same free media channel as every other is, and we created the                 
preconditions for this channel to emerge’ (Vabariigi Valitsus, 2015).  
4.5. 2014-5: Russian-speaking Minority  
The most successful Russian-speaking asset of ERR, country’s most popular radio station in             
Russian Raadio 4, lost thousands of followers in 2014, who clearly expressed their criticism              
over ‘pro-Ukrainian’ stance and ‘little amount of Putin’s position.’ ERR leadership admitted            
the problem, although in part tried to tie it with growing rivalry with privately owned radios                
(Paris, 2014).  
In May 2014, minister of culture Urve Tiidus brought together an advisory commission to              
discuss mediaspace in Russian. Out of 16 members of the commission, two were Russians,              
and slightly below half worked in the media industry at the moment. The most surprising               
figure, perhaps, was deputy director of Estonian Security Police Martin Arpo. Involvement of             
Security Police (Kaitsepolitsei or ​Kapo in Estonian) was questioned by several           
Russian-speaking journalists, who suggested it will offer ​‘our good propaganda instead of            
their bad propaganda’ and predicted ‘moral defeat’ of the channel before the actual start              
(Garanža, 2014; Titov, 2014). Kapo’s work area, indeed, has little to do with the media               
management. However, from mid-1990s onwards Kapo publishes a yearbook, where          
institution outlines it main achievements and successes. Among them, often popular local            
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Russian-speaking politicians are criticized of their alleged connections to Kremlin or Russian            
Embassy in Tallinn, as are several low-scale media outlets, colloquially labelled           
‘propagandistic’ over the years (Kaitsepolitsei, 2020). Despite controversial composition,         
after initial meeting the commission suggested to increase funding of Russian-speaking radio            
and web news service of ERR, and launch a brand-new public TV channel in Russian               
(Mihelson, 2014).  
Local Russian-speaking journalists and public figures were eager to discuss perspectives of a             
TV channel. Information war discourse was common within the minority, too. Several            
journalists employed at a preoperational stage before the air of ETV+, rushed to confirm it               
will be unbiased, should not be ‘counter-propaganda’ and they are not going to follow              
guidelines from Estonian government on the way they cover events in they programs, if              
received any (Solomina, 2015; Sokol, 2015; Loide, 2015). The fact itself that public             
broadcasting journalists found such wording suitable for description of their own work, draws             
special attention to the matter: even they perceived the channel as a part of information war                
but tried to convince the Russian-speaking audience it will be impartial.  
One of the most prominent politicians of the minority, MEP Yana Toom of Centre Party was                
clear: ‘the aim of ETV + is to resist Russian propaganda and to adequately inform local                
Russian-speakers about events on which they receive allegedly false information from           
Russian TV programs’. With experience in journalism before entering into politics, Toom            
took advantage of criticizing Russian-speaking media decline in a broader sense and tied it              
with the peculiarities of Estonia’s Russian-speaking school system. Strong supporter of           
state-paid full schooling in Russian, Toom predicted ETV+ will mostly be run by diletants,              
who are unprofessional due to allegedly discriminatory education system (Toom, 2015).  
Lack of experienced and qualified local Russian-speaking personnel was evident to numerous            
observers. While some asserted to the opportunity of collaboration with liberally-minded TV            
channels of the former Soviet Union (Kopylkov, 2014; Toots, 2014), others emphasized the             
necessity for broader coverage of local issues, brought up by local people, making their              
voices heard (Kitam, 2014; Ladõnskaja, 2014). This should help people familiarize with the             
content, as both the topics and the journalists would be ‘their own’.  
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Toom’s ally from Center Party, member of Riigikogu Mihhail Stalnuhhin, was ironic and             
skeptical about TV channel for Russian-speakers. Speaking at the parliament, he criticized            
previous unsuccessful integration policy: ‘instead of improving the lives of these           
[Russian-speaking] people and talking to them in a human way, of course, we went the other                
way <...> public money was given to launch a separate TV channel for the Russians’.               
Famous for his stance as a very skeptical of Estonian state in general, Stalnuhhin thus               
challenged the idea of a special channel for Russian-speakers and alluded integration and             
language policy over the years must have been different and probably less conservative. To              
illustrate his point, he asserted that the state should ‘in advance’ launch a channel in Arabic                
and Swahili, since ‘in a few years a larger number of Swahili-speaking people will arrive’ to                
Estonia, referring to EU migration quotas (Stalnuhhin, 2015). Needless to say, sardonic            
remarks did not provoke further debate at the parliament. In this commentary, Stalnuhhin did              
not only make somewhat racist remarks and exaggerated the amount of Europe-wide            
allocated refugees (Estonia had to accept slightly above 240), but also suggested in Saidian              
way that for more than two decades autochthon population has treated Russian-speakers the             
way those migrants are treated.  
Russian-speakers in Estonia is a relatively big but poorly organized diaspora. With local             
media outlets in Russian being in decline for years both in terms of quality and amount,                
establishment of a new TV channel presumably should have encouraged those belonging to             
Russian-speaking minority to support it, as one would provide people with new and unbiased              
medium to discuss their agendas. However understanding the framing and unspoken language            
of policy-making, journalists and public figures of the minority emphasized the new channel             
should be not only independent from government, but in way must also contribute to              
identity-building process, as was noted one of the experts (Nael, 2014a). Stress not only on               
the language, but also on the personnel choices and well-pronounced independence is a mark              
of uncertainty about the group itself. Ethnic minority with a weak self-organisation, it is              
forced to construct its identity even in a situation, when it is not questioned. Or, in Roe words                  
‘the group may necessarily be imbued, both by itself and by others, with a certain               
‘security-ness’ that, if removed, necessarily results in the death of the minority itself’ (2004).  
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Rather exceptional in a above mentioned debate, translator Andrei Tuch suggested that            
channel is not needed, since it will lack both audience and journalists, as the market is not big                  
enough to ensure quality and consistency of a TV product, and launching a channel will               
deprive Russian-speakers of motivation to learn Estonian. However negative in tone, Tuch            
aptly noted that ‘launching a full Russian-language public TV channel may be seen as a               
gesture of indulgence that a previously reluctant Estonia can now make’ (Tuch, 2015). Thus,              
ethnic minority could fully understand majority’s superior role, but would accept it as a sign               
of a defeat of decades-long conservative language policy – if Russian-speakers were            
assimilated linguistically and politically, the state would hardly address the issue via launch             
of a TV channel. Hence, minority is accepted as such and its identity is even supported by the                  
government, which should allow to desecurize its identity. Or, in Jutila’s words ‘if             
governmental policies are informed by multiculturalist ideas and those ideas are widely            
supported by the majority, then the representatives of a national minority do not have to               
securitize their identity in order to have specific minority rights’ (2006). On the contrary,              
from Estonian government’s point of view, the additional effort was paid and funding was              
provided for Russian-speakers, which provides us with an example of a securitized minority.  
4.6. 2015: The Channel in Party Platforms  
The 2015 elections of national parliament Riigikogu resulted in a change of legislature             
composition: in addition to previously represented four (liberal Reform Party, social liberal            
Center Party, Social Democrats, and conservative Pro Patria and Res Publica Union), two             
new parties were elected to the parliament: far-right Conservative People's Party of Estonia             
and conservative Free Party. Thus, the parliament composition significantly shifted to the            
right of political spectrum. Given the changes in a political landscape with emphasis on              
right-wing ideologies and regional securital uncertainty amid developments in Ukraine, the           
campaign prior to the elections provided a ground for security-themed debate beyond            
traditional military domain.  
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In case of the six elected parties, platforms presented during campaign period mostly             9
contained sections on integration or social cohesion, as well as safety and security. These              
often included provisions or suggestions, related to public TV in Russian or topics of              
informational warfare. Pro Patria and Res Publica Union or IRL had a small section on               
public broadcasting in its platform, including the idea of a party member Anvar Samost,              
stating that Russian-speaking channel shall be launched in ‘tight cooperation with other states             
and public broadcasters interested.’ It also promised to broaden ‘the opportunities of the             
Russian-speaking audience to receive neutral information about events in Estonia.’ The           
section on security warned readers about Russian ambitions for military actions abroad, and             
urged to resist hybrid conflicts and develop social cohesion within society in order to ‘oppose               
Russia's information war’ (IRL, 2015). The Estonian Free Party was laconic, stating ‘We             
support the development of high-quality public Russian-language media.’ Admitting         
difficulties of current security situation in the region, the Free Party platform tied it with               
internal safety, stating the state has to follow ‘Russian pressure’ on the issues of language and                
ethnicity (Vabaerakond, 2015). Conservative People's Party of Estonia or ​EKRE did not            10
mention any of the topics related to media in their platform. However, one admitted they are                
going to ensure ‘comprehensive security in cooperation with non-military structures’ (EKRE,           
2015). The latter can be interpreted in numerous ways, which does not allow us to conclude it                 
was the pretext for a Russian-speaking media issue. 
Outlining security goals, Reform Party included the notions of ‘psychological security,’           
‘hostile information operations,’ and providing ‘objective information’ to Estonian residents          
in their promises for upcoming election. Opposite to its politicians’ previous rhetoric,            11
Reform Party also opted for global Russian-language TV channel, jointly funded by NATO             
allies. At the same time, Estonia’s own Russian-speaking channel idea was not abandoned. It              
was still open for interpretations though, suggesting the viewers must have an opportunity to              
choose subtitles either in Estonian or Russian, or Russian voicing if watching public TV via               
digital hardware. Promising salary increase to ERR journalists, the party also referred to             
9 Other than these six parties did not have maximum amount of candidates for the election, often resulting in 
media leaving them out of debates reserved for ‘big’ parties. Therefore, their agendas are not included in this 
study. 
10 Est. keele- ja rahvuspõhise ebastabiilsus. 
11 Est. “Eesti elanike objektiivne informeerimine ning psühholoogilise kaitse arendamine, mis võimaldaks 
vältida vaenulike infomanipulatsioonide mõju.” 
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Russian-speakers, asserting ERR has to provide ‘all groups of the society’ with ‘information             
based on democratic values of Estonia’ (Reformierakond, 2015). Estonian Center Party           
outlined various security-related activities in their platform, summarizing them as ability of            
Estonia ‘to cope with unconventional threats, including hybrid warfare.’ Discussing media,           
the party suggested media should be free and diverse. According to the program, the media               
channels can be categorized in three types: ‘private, public and municipal’ (Keskerakond,            
2015). The latter probably refers to media assets of Tallinn and number of smaller              
municipalities, run by the Center Party. In sections devoted to culture and integration,             
program by Social Democrats promised to open a ‘Russian-language ETV channel,’ ensure            
its funding and open its office to mostly Russian-speaking Ida-Viru region. The            
security-themed section did not include provisions on hybrid or information warfare (SDE,            
2015).  
Therefore, all big parties but far-right EKRE in one way or another made a mention of a TV                  
channel in Russian, either perceiving it as a subject of culture and social cohesion, or purely a                 
security matter. While sharing an understanding regarding the necessity of a channel, several             
parties still proposed slightly different operational solutions, e.g. a regional studio or subtitles             
for existing broadcasting. Also, parties justified the need to establish a channel in a different               
manner. Discussing broad concepts of security, several of them included notions such as             
informational warfare as a challenge in their programs, praising support of a            
Russian-speaking channel as a solution. While not applicable to each out of six programs, in               
case of IRL and Reform Party, one may see an outlined existential threat (hybrid warfare,               
clearly or allegedly attributed to Russia), and referent object (social cohesion, which is             
ensuring Estonian sovereignty). With voters supporting, among other things, those proposals           
of the parties, securitization can be considered successful.  
Overlapping approach to security matters can be explained by fact that following the             
elections, winning Reform Party included IRL into governmental coalition aside their           
previous partner Social Democrats. Therefore, all the three of coalition parties supported the             
channel, but two of them legitimized it as an issue of security.  
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5. Conclusions 
The current master’s thesis explored securitization in relation to Russian-speaking minority           
and media in Estonia. Securitization theory emerged as an analytical tool for security studies              
following the fall of bipolar world, initially broadening security dimension to environment            
and economics. Broadly defining security, scholars suggested that securitizing is possible           
through speech act. Later on, securitization theory has been applied to other domains,             
including the issue of ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. One of these,              
Russian-speakers in Estonia, make up to a quarter of Baltic country’s population. With             
sophisticated history of relations with autochthon population, level of Russian-speakers’          
integration with Estonian society varied significantly over time, depending on age, income,            
citizenship, knowledge of Estonian and other factors.  
Estonian Russian-speakers demonstrate diverse patterns in following various media. Aside          
declining local newspapers and stable radios and news websites, the television market is             
slightly different. Due to numerous legal and economic preconditions, local privately owned            
Russian-speaking TV stations have not gained popularity, and TV stations broadcasting in            
Estonian have neither. This resulted in Russian-speakers being adherent to TV stations            
broadcasting from Russia, or those officially registered in European Union and transmitting            
Russian TV content under franchise.  
During two major political crises, Estonian public considered such media consumption           
pattern somewhat dangerous for country’s well-being. Several voices were raised to launch a             
public Russian-speaking channel on the basis of national broadcasting ERR. The thesis            
explored two case studies of public debate on the matter: the situation following so-called              
Bronze Soldier crisis of 2007-8, and the one following Russian annexation of Crimea and              
beginning of war in Donbass of 2014-5.  
With importance of sufficiently informing Russian-speakers realized by decision-makers         
from early days of restored independence, the debate over necessity of public TV for              
Russian-speakers saw two main phases, related to domestic (Bronze Soldier crisis) or global             
(Crimea annexation and Donbass war) events. In the first phase of 2007-8, the identified              
existential threat has been twofold, including both part of local Russian-speaking minority, as             
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well as Russian media outlets and allegedly Russian special forces, who carried out cyber              
attacks. Due to Russian-speakers media habits being different from that of Estonians, several             
politicians and experts have raised concern about the extent they are informed regarding             
developments in Estonia. Several options were suggested, including temporary TV channel,           
subtitles for existing ETV in Russian or Estonian, or commissioning talk shows from a              
privately owned TV station. In their rhetoric, numerous speakers alluded to propagandistic            
nature of Russian TV, and tied it to various topics, even including interpretations of World               
War II events. Little consensus could be observed between politicians or opinion leaders,             
resulting in launching ETV2, which only had daily newscast and couple of project-funded             
talk shows. Once ETV2 was launched with minimal effort from the management of ERR, and               
little additional funding from the budget, the debate over informing Russian-speakers cooled            
down.  
Following tragic events in Ukraine with annexation of Crimea and war in Donbass, the              
debate over necessity of a TV channel for Russian-speakers intensified again, citing Russian             
alleged success in hybrid and information war as a cause. Again, several initiatives were              
suggested, ranging from a joint Europe-wide TV channel in Russian to finally approved by              
the government Estonia’s own public Russian-language channel, which was eventually          
named ETV+. Here, the widespread discussion over information war can be observed.            
Several public figures described the ongoing situation as modern-day war, therefore           
suggesting ETV+ has to be perceived as a part of information or psychological security. Most               
of politicians and experts were in favor of creation of the channel, regardless of their               
ethnicity, language of publication, political or professional affiliation. Less supportive or           
negative views on the channel have been expressed too, citing little budget, lack of              
professional Russian-speaking journalists and distrust of the audience as main obstacles for            
success. The tone of the publication did not depend on a context, with parliament members               
expressing their views in the same way as others.  
The overview of 2015 parliamentary elections party programs allows us to conclude, despite             
discrepancies in the details, the consensus over ETV+ was common with most of big political               
parties. Numerous journalists, media executives and politicians struggled to convince the           
audience about new channel not being a tool of governmental propaganda. Russian-speakers            
especially criticized little presence of their ethnic group in preparational activity of the             
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channel, as well as brief involvement of Security Police. Although some raised concerns over              
paternalistic way in which Estonians launch a channel for Russian-speakers, others expressed            
a hope the channel will help minority to strengthen its identity. Remarkable part of the debate                
focused on personnel matters and funding, the latter often confronted with military spendings.             
After vivid and diverse public discussion, involving wide range of opinions, ETV+ was             
founded and cited as one of outcomes of the work prime-minister Rõivas’ cabinet carried out,               
while in office.  
Current master’s thesis allows for several developments in the future. While it can be              
assumed that above mentioned discussion over the channel involving propaganda-related          
vocabulary was not warmly welcomed by the channel’s audience, it is hard to establish a               
strong correlation between channel’s rather modest reach in subsequent years and its previous             
securitization. With changes in Estonian media market in recent years, the composition of TV              
channels and programs have changed significantly, resulting in audience adjusting their           
preferences. Unprecedented pandemics of COVID-19 and relevant coverage in the media           
allow for new empirical studies, combining both the securitization and the media of/for ethnic              
or linguistic minorities. Also, with possible technological shifts and TV advancements in            
digital sphere, new possibilities for studies arise. Even within relatively stable domestic            
political situation without clearly articulated inter-ethnic conflict, securitization of         
Russian-speaking minority in various fields can be studied in Estonia, or in comparison to              
other similar cases. Russian-speaking minorities are present in several countries in Europe            
and beyond, with public media Russian-language outlets available in many of those, making             
a solid foundation for subsequent studies.  
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Kokkuvõte  
Käesolev magistritöö “Eesti venekeelse meedia julgeolekustamine ETV+ kanali näitel”         
analüüsib kanali loomisele eelnenud arutelu julgeolekustamise teooria abil. Poliitikute,         
ekspertide ja ajakirjanike osalusel toimunud arutelu järel telekanal ETV+ hakkas tööle 2015.            
aastal Eesti Rahvusringhäälingu osana.  
Alustuseks, magistritöös vaadeldakse Kopenhaageni koolkonna välja töötatud       
julgeolekustamise (​securitization​) teooria. Teooria laiendab julgeoleku mõistet       
mittesõjalistele valdkondadele. Kopenhaageni koolkonna järgi küsimus muutub julgeoleku        
küsimuseks, kui see asetatakse igapäevase poliitika kohale ning kui julgeolekustaja veenab           
sihtrühma eksistentsiaalse ohu suhtes, mida see referentobjektile kujutab. Vaatamata         
ulatuslikule kriitikale on julgeolekustamine rakendatav ka rahvusvähemuste küsimuste puhul. 
Magistritöös uuritakse Eestis elavate venekeelsete inimeste sotsiaalset ja poliitilist tausta,          
pöörates erilist tähelepanu venekeelsele meediamaastikule. Seejärel uuritakse ETV+        
teemalises arutelus kasutusel olnud argumente. 
Pärast valdavalt siseriikliku (nn Pronksiöö) või piirkondliku (Krimmi annekteerimine ja sõda           
Ida-Ukrainas) ulatusega kriisi hakati muret väljendama Eesti venekeelse vähemuse pärast.          
Eriliseks tähelepanu objektiks seejuures sai kõnealuse grupi arvatav vastuvõtlikkus Venemaa          
valitsuse kontrollitud meediale ning seetõttu on seatud kahtluse alla venekeelsete inimeste           
lojaalsust Eesti riigi suhtes. Seega, venekeelsed inimesed olid Eesti avalikus arutelus           
kujutatud rühmana, mis on Vene infosõja suhtes kõige haavatavam. Erapooletu          
meediakajastuse tagamiseks üritati aastatel 2007-8 luua avalik-õiguslik venekeelne kanal.         
Need pingutused ei kandnud vilja ning riik piirdus venekeelsete telesaadete tellimise           
toetamisega. 
2014.–15. aastail elavnenud arutelu venekeelse kanali üle langes kokku Euroopa parlamendi           
(2014) ja Riigikogu (2015) valimistega, muutudes poliitikute ja kandidaatide poolt laialdaselt           
arutatavaks teemaks. Nii telekanali pooldajad kui ka vastased viitasid oma argumentatsioonis           
Ukraina kriisile ja Venemaa hübriidsõjale. Julgeolekustavad märkused olid ühiskondlikus         
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debatis laialdaselt levinud, sõltumata kõneleja rahvusest ja/või emakeelest, poliitilisest või          
ametialasest kuuluvusest. 
Kohalik venekeelne vähemus oli arutelu varajases etapis vähe kaasatud ning selle avaliku elu             
tegelased olid uue kanali loomise viisi ja ajastuse suhtes skeptilised. Mitmed poliitikud ja             
ajakirjanikud üritasid publikut veenda, et uue kanali puhul ei ole tegemist vastupropaganda            
vahendiga. Kanali loomine oli erakondlikust poliitikast üle, sest nii koalitsioon kui ka            
opositsioon peamiselt toetasid seda, kuigi erinevaid põhjendusi kasutades. 
Magistritöös jõutakse järeldusele, et julgeolekustatud ühiskondlik arutelu kui selline ei ole           
piisav, et hinnata kanali taju sihtrühma poolt ja selle edasist sooritust. Seetõttu pakutakse             
välja mitmeid muid võimalusi edaspidisteks uuringuteks. 
 
Märksõnad: Eesti, meedia, rahvusvähemus, julgeolekustamine, venekeelne vähemus 
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Резюме 
В настоящей магистерской работе «Секьюритизация русскоязычных медиа в Эстонии         
на примере телеканала ЭТВ+» при помощи теории секьюритизации анализируется         
предшествующая созданию канала общественная дискуссия. После дискуссии при        
участии политиков, экспертов и журналистов телеканал ЭТВ+ начал работу в 2015 г. в             
составе Эстонской общественной телерадиовещательной корпорации.  
Во-первых, в магистерской работе рассматривается разработанная Копенгагенской       
школой теория секьюритизации (англ. ​securitization​). Данная теория расширяет        
понятие безопасности за пределы военной сферы. Согласно Копенгагенской школе,         
какой-либо вопрос становится вопросом безопасности, когда он ставится выше         
обычного политического процесса, и актор убеждает целевую аудиторию в         
экзистенциальной опасности для референтного объекта. Несмотря на обширную        
критику, теория секьюритизации применима в исследовании национальных       
меньшинств. 
В магистерской работе исследуется социальный и политический контекст        
русскоязычных людей, проживающих в Эстонии. При этом, особое внимание         
уделяется традиционным медиа, работающим в стране на русском языке. Затем          
исследуются аргументы, применявшиеся в ходе дискуссии об ЭТВ+. 
После преимущественно внутреннего (т.н. Бронзовая ночь) или регионального        
(аннексия Крыма и война на востоке Украины) кризиса многие выражали          
озабоченность в отношении проживающих в Эстонии русскоязычных. Объектом        
пристального внимания при этом стала предполагаемая восприимчивость данной        
группы к подконтрольным правительству Российской Федерации средствам массовой        
информации. Ввиду этого, многими ставилась под сомнение лояльность        
русскоязычного меньшинства Эстонской Республике. Таким образом, в общественной        
дискуссии внутри Эстонии русскоязычные люди были изображены в качестве группы,          
наиболее уязвимой к российской информационной войне. Для обеспечения        
независимого освещения событий в 2007-8 гг. планировалось создать        
общественно-правовой телеканал на русском языке. Эти усилия не увенчались         
43 
успехом, и государство ограничилось поддержкой производства отдельных       
русскоязычных телепередач. 
В 2014-15 гг. дискуссия о русскоязычном канале вновь оживилась и совпала с            
выборами в Европейский (2014) и национальный (2015) парламенты, став предметом          
широкого обсуждения со стороны политиков и кандидатов. Как сторонники, так и           
противники создания телеканала в своей аргументации ссылались на кризис в Украине           
и гибридную войну России. В общественной дискуссии была широко распространена          
риторика секьюритизации, вне зависимости от национальности и/или родного языка,         
политической или профессиональной принадлежности делающего высказывание лица. 
На раннем этапе русскоязычное меньшинство было слабо вовлечено в дискуссию, и           
некоторые ключевые фигуры данного меньшинства скептически высказывались о        
способе и времени создания телеканала. Ряд политиков и журналистов стремились          
убедить публику, что новый канал не будет средством контрпропаганды. Создание          
телеканала было выше партийной политики, поскольку как коалиция, так и оппозиция           
в основном поддерживали его, хоть и приводя при этом различные доводы. 
Магистерская работа приходит к заключению, что изобилующая примерами        
секьюритизации общественная дискуссия как таковая не является достаточной, чтобы         
оценивать восприятие канала целевой аудиторией и его дальнейшие показатели. В          
связи с этим, предлагается ряд возможностей для потенциальных исследований.  
 
Ключевые слова: Эстония, медиа, СМИ, национальное меньшинство, секьюритизация,        
русскоязычные 
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